INTRODUCTION
They say the "truth" (or "al-haq" as the Arabs like to say), is usually the first casualty of war. And so it was with the Israel-Hezbollah conflict that caught the world's attention in the summer of 2006. As the editors of the Yearbook promised its readers in volume 11:
The UN's inaction, backed, regrettably, by the US and Britain, has led to the destruction of the Lebanese infrastructure and the displacement of some 900,000 Lebanese from the south of the country. Although the UN has been slow to act a resolution has finally been passed, resolution 1701 . . . Despite the initial reluctance of some European countries to send troops, this is now being built up. A fragile peace remains. The action taken by Israel is a subject which will certainly be a dominant feature in next year's volume. 2 This article assesses the factual situation that led to the conflict and compares Israel's recourse to armed force with the principles and norms of international law as set out in the Charter of the United Nations (hereafter "UN Charter"), the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (hereafter "ICJ"), and the writings of legal scholars. 3 In the following pages, the question of what amounts to an "armed attack" entitling a State which has been attacked to respond with lawful force in selfdefence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter is examined in some detail. This article will not, however, address the extent to which Israel's actions in Lebanon amount to a breach of international humanitarian law and what possible consequences might arise from this conclusion. 4 Rather, it will focus on the rules regarding the recourse to armed force. Nor will it examine the relationship between the Lebanese Government and Hezbollah. 5 Suffice it to say that the international responsibility of a state will be engaged if it knowingly allows its territory to be used to attack another state. 6 In this respect, the Lebanese government has denied all responsibility. 7 It is submitted that Israel's bombardment, blockade and subsequent invasion of southern Lebanon could not be excused as an act of self-defence under international law, as these actions were unnecessary and disproportionate. Rather, it would seem that Israel's actions, being both offensive and punitive, would be more accurately described as acts of aggression contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and customary international law. This article will further argue that even if Israel had invoked the "needle-prick" or "accumulation of events" theory of selfdefence, which it has done in the past and which has been considered on occasion by the ICJ, the actions of Israel's Armed Forces would not be justified. 8 Nor, for that matter, would Israel's actions in the Lebanon meet the Caroline test of necessity which will be examined in more depth below. 9 Of course, this is not to say that Israel does
